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I. Introduction
"An era of advocacy has begun out of which, I am
sure, public assistance is never going to be the same."
* A.B. Cornell University, 1961,
LL.B. Columbia University, School of
Law, 1964. Director, BoaIt-Hastings
Clinical Law Program. Lecturer in
Law, University of California, BoaIt
Hall. Instructor in Law, Hastings College of the Law. Member, New York
and California State Bars.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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The author would like to note that
he was counsel in several of the cases
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John C. Montgomery [Former California State Welfare Director, in his final press statement as Director,
1969].
In California, over 1,500,000 people are dependent on
public assistance for all or part of their means of subsistence. l
To provide aid to these individuals, a large and complex
bureaucracy has developed over the years that expends more
than a billion dollars a year,2 and is governed by an evergrowing set of federal, state, and local rules and regulations. s
Notwithstanding the size of the bureaucracy and the complexity of the laws governing the system, until recently there
had been few instances of judicial review of welfare practices
or laws. With a few exceptions,4 the court decisions relating
to welfare prior to 1968 dealt with situations where conflicts
between county and state welfare agencies were resolved,5 or
where appeals were taken from convictions in welfare fraud
prosecutions. 6 It was unusual to have a recipient seek affirm-
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1. U. S. Department of HEW, Social
Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 12, p. 69
(December, 1969).
2. State Department of Social Welfare, Division of Research and Statistics, Draft Tables 1 & 50. Prepared
for the 1968-1969 Annual Statistical
Report, as yet unpublished.
This amount reflects the total welfare
expenditures that are paid from federal,
state, and county funds. The federal
government provides approximately
50% of the cost; the state, approximately 30%; and the counties, approximately 20%.
3. From the federal government
comes 42 U.S.c. §§ 301 et seq. (The
Social Security Act), the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare's
Handbook ot Public Assistance Administration, and regulations in the
Code of Federal Regulations. California has codified its public assistance
laws in the Welfare and Institutions
Code. Its regulations are compiled in
560

the State Department of Social Welfares' Manual ot Policies and Procedures. Other state manuals are the
Fiscal Manual and the Research and
Statistics Manual. Each county promulgates its own rules and regulations
regarding its relief programs.
4. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal.2d
733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697
(1967); Cox v. State Social Welfare
Board, 193 Cal. App.2d 708, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 776 (1961); Pearson v. State
Social Welfare Bd., 54 Cal.2d 184, 5
Cal. Rptr. 553, 353 P.2d 33 (1960).
5. See, e.g., County of L. A. v Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal.2d
455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953); County of
Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Board,
229 Cal. App.2d 762, 40 Cal Rptr. 605
(1964).
6. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 55 Cal.
2d 521, 11 Cal Rptr. 537, 360 P.2d
33, 92 A.L.R.2d 413 (1961); People v.
Owens, 231 Cal. App.2d 691, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 153 (1965).
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ative judicial redress on the grounds that welfare aid was
illegally or unconstitutionally denied. Despite the substantial efforts of a few scholars-most notably Dr. Jacobus ten
Broek7-little serious discussion of the legal issues raised by
the welfare system was undertaken.
Not until the mid-sixties, with its emphasis on social reform
and legal assistance to the poor, did the first substantial debates on welfare issues begin to take shape in California and
the rest of the country. 8 With the funding of federally supported neighborhood law offices, under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,9 litigation having potentially enormous
impact on the administration of public assistance began in
earnest. Practices and laws are now under challenge that in
the past certainly would have been found illegal or unconstitutional had legal representation been available. 10 In part, the
result of years of isolation from judicial scrutiny is now causing
some disruption in the smooth administration of the system.
Yet, for those who value the rule of law and the duty of state
administrators to abide by it, such judicial review is essential
to a properly ordered administrative system. The shock of
having been exposed to the bright light of judicial review has
caused some consternation among those who advocate the
insulation of government from the legal challenges of the
poor.n
Much of the welfare litigation in California in 1969 has
been directed to the enforcement of existing law as well as
7. See, e.g., Jacobus ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law:
Its Origin, Development and Present
Status. Part I, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257
(1964); Part II, 16 Stan. L. Rev.
900 (1964). See also Jacobus ten
Broek and Floyd W. Matson: The
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
Cal. L. Rev. 809 (1966).
8. Symposium: Law of the Poor.
54 Cal. L. Rev. 319 (1966).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et. seq. (1964).
10. Before federal funding of legal
assistance offices in 1964, the welfare
CAL LAW 1970
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recipient's case was seldom presented
to the courts. Welfare administrators
were free to interpret statutes and rules
almost at will. Loren Miller, Race,
Poverty and the Law, 54 Cal. L. Rev.
386, 396-97 (1966).
11. Senator Murphy introduced an
amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act that was not passed but that
was aimed at preventing legal services
programs from suing government
agencies. S.B. 3016; 91st Congress,
2nd session. Introduced on October
10, 1969.
561
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to the challenge, on constitutional grounds, of welfare laws,
regulations, and practices. 12 Some of these court actions have
resulted in increasing the cost of public assistance programs. 13
For the most part, however, these added costs have resulted
from judicially ordered compliance with existing law; the
implication is that for years welfare administrators have been,
and still are, illegally depriving thousands of persons of welfare
aid to which they are legally entitled.
Before turning to a discussion of the significant court decisions of 1969, a brief overview of the California welfare
system is in order. 14

II. Public Assistance in California
Public assistance in California, as in most other states, IS
administered through two basic types of programs:
( 1) the "categorical assistance" programs established by
the Social Security Act,15 (implemented by regulations
adopted by the U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, supervised by the state, administered by the
individual counties,16 and supported by county, state,
and federal funds);l7 and
(2) the general assistance program created by state law 18
12. See infra, for a detailed discussion of these cases.

13. The state estimated that one of
the cases discussed infra, could cost
about $9,000,000 in federal, state, and
local funds. Nesbitt v. Montgomery,
No. 193675, Sac. Sup. Ct. (Memorandum Opinion filed October 1, 1969).

14. A full description of the present
welfare system is beyond the scope of
this article. For those interested in
the subject, see Wedemeyer & Moore,
The American Welfare System, 54 Cal.
L. Rev. 326 (1966); see also, Report of the Senate Social Welfare Subcommittee on General Research, A
Study of Welfare Expenditures, Vol.
21, No. 15 (1969).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20
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15. 42 U.S.C.
16. Cal Welf.
10600, 10800.

§§

301 et seq.

&

Inst.

Code

§§

17. Total expenditures for cash
grants for the year were $1,189,825,199; federal expenditures were $548,211,131; state expenditures, $453,053,415; and county expenditures, $188,560,653. State Department of Social
Welfare, Division of Research and
Statistics, Draft Table 1, prepared for
the 1968-1969 Annual Statistical Report, as yet unpublished.
18. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 17000.
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but supervised and administered by each county and
supported solely by county funds. 19
Most recipients receive financial aid under the "categorical
assistance" programs.2ll Under the Social Security Act, certain categories of needy persons are entitled to receive federally supported public assistance. The elderly (those over 65)
are eligible for Old Age Assistance l (known in California
as Old Age Security); certain classes of needy children are
eligible for aid and services to needy families with children2
(known in California as AFDC;3 needy blind are entitled
to aid to the blind;4 and permanently disabled persons are
eligible for aid to the permanently and totally disabled 6
(known in California as A TD) . Thus, aside from other
specific eligibility requirements discussed below, a person
must be needy6 and must be either aged,7 blind,S a dependent
child9 or the caretaker of a dependent child,l° or permanently
and totally disabled ll in order to receive assistance under the
Social Security Act.
Those persons who do not fit within one of the federally
created categories are eligible only for general assistance, the
19. Cal. Welf. &
Inst. Code
17001. County of Los Angeles v.
Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal.
2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
§

20. In California, in August 1969,
73,900 recipients were receiving county
general assistance, whereas approximately 1,500,000 were counted on the
categorical aid programs. U. S. Dept.
of Health, Education and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Social
Security Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 12, p.
69 (Dec., 1969).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644.
3. AFDC is also provided to families
where one of the parents is unemployed. This program is referred to as
the AFDC-U program. Welf. & Inst.
Code § 11201. Because of federal
eligibility conditions, a significant porCAL. LAW 1970
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tion of the AFDC program for the unemployed in California is funded solely
from state and county funds.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206. California has developed two types of aid
programs for the blind. The first, Aid
to the Blind, is contained in sections
12500 et. seq. (Chapter 4) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The second
category, Aid to the Potentially SelfSupporting Blind, is contained in sections 13000 et. seq. (Chapter 5) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
5. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1351-1355.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201,
1351.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 302.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1202.
9. 42 U.S.c. § 602.
10. 42 U.S.c. § 602.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1352.
563
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welfare program funded entirely by local governments in
California. 12 The basic requirements for general assistance
are indigency and county residence. 13
The Social Security Act establishes various requirements
for a state's categorical assistance programs that, if complied
with, result in federal participation in the costs of assistance
provided to California's eligible poor. A state must conform
to federal requirements in order to receive federal participation.14 Failure to comply with federal requirements could
result, in theory, in the loss of federal funds for the entire
program. 15 Basic requirements common to each of the categorical assistance programs include: state-wide operation of
the program,16 financial participation by the state,17 designation of a single state agency to administer the plan of public
assistance,18 an opportunity for a hearing for individuals aggrieved by welfare department action,19 safeguards on the use
12. The county general assistance
program and the obligation placed on
each of the counties to est ablish such
programs is created by Section 17000
of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
which states:
"Every county and every city and
county shall relieve and support all
incompetent, poor, indigent persons,
and those incapacitated by age, disease,
or accident, lawfully resident therein,
when such persons are not supported
and relieved by their relatives or
friends, by their own means, or by state
hospitals or other state or private institutions. "
13. Requirements of indigency and
lawful residency are contained in Welf.
& Inst. Code § 17000. As a result of
the decision in Montgomery v. Burns,
394 U.S. 848, 23 L.Ed.2d 31, 89 S.C!.
1623 (1969), a county may no longer
impose durational residency requirements.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 302, 602, 1202,
1352.
15. The Secretary of Health, Edu564

cation and Welfare may, after opportunity for hearing, discontinue federal
payments to a state for its welfare
programs. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604(a).
In practice, such conformity hearings
have been rarely held and in no instance have funds been withheld from
the state. See general Note, Federal
Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 84 (1967).
16. 42 U.S.c. § 302(a)(1)-(OAS);
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)-(AFDC); 42
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)-(AB); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1352(a)(1)-(ATD).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(2)-(OAS); 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(2)-(AFDC); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a)(2)-(AB); 42 U.S.C. § 1352
(a)(2)-(ATD).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(3)-(OAS);
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)-(AFDC); 42
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(3)-(AB); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1352(a)(3)-(ATD).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(4)-(OAS);
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4)-(AFDC); 42
U.S.c. § 1202(a)(4)-(AB); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1352(a)(4)-(ATD).
CAL LAW 1970
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or disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients,20 and the furnishing of assistance promptly to all eligible
individuals. l In addition, each public assistance title under
the Social Security Act contains certain conformity requirements particular to the type of recipient it benefits.:! To the
extent that any state statutes or regulations conflict with the
Social Security Act or federal regulations promulgated thereunder, such statutes or regulations are invalid. s
The requirements of the Social Security Act are supplemented by federal regulations issued by the Department of
Health. Education and Welfare that are binding on each of
the states in the administration of their public assistance
programs.'
The statutory authority for the categorical aid programs in
California is found in the Welfare and Institutions Code. 6
Categorical assistance programs are administered by the individual county welfare departments subject to the rules, regulations, and overall supervision of the State Department of
Social Welfare. 6
20. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(7)--(OAS);
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9)-(AFDC); 42
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(9)--(AB); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1352(a)(9)--(ATD).

1. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(8)--(OAS);
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)-(AFDC); 42
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(11)-(AB); 42 U.S.c.
§ 1353(a) (lO)-(ATD).
2. Compare the following sections of
42 U.S.C.: 302, 602, 1202, 1352.
3. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 20
L.Ed.2d 1118, 88 S.Ct. 2128 (1968).
It is the policy of this state to conform
to the requirements of federal law.
See Pearson v. State Social Welfare
Board, 54 Cal.2d 184,214, 5 Cal. Rptr.
553, 571, 353 P.2d 33, 51, and Welf.
and Inst. Code § 11003.
4. Federal regulations are found in
the HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration and are now being
recodified in 45 Code of Federal Regulations. All new and proposed regula-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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tions are published initially in the Federal Register and then recodified in 45
Code of Federal Regulations.
5. Like the Social Security Act, the
Welfare and Institutions Code is divided into separate sections covering
both the eligibility requirements and
grant payments for each of the separate aid categories. For example, the
statutes governing the AFDC program
are set out at Welfare & Institutions
Code §§ 11,200-11,488.
There are
also a number of code sections generally applicable to the programs and
the administration of public social
services.
Welf.
&
Inst.
Code
§§ 10,000-11,158.
6. The regulations of the State Welfare Department are found primarily
in the Manual of Policies and Procedures; among other regulations issued
by the Department are the Fiscal Manual, the Research and Statistics Manual,
and the Operations Manual.
565
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The federal act (with the exception of a recently enacted
provision7 that is now the subject of litigation in California)8
does not specify a standard or level of living to be used by
the states in administering their assistance programs. Consequently, each state is responsible (within the limits of state
law and the Constitution) for defining the standard of living
that is used to determine who "needy persons" are in relation
to each of its federally aided assistance programs, as well as
the amounts of assistance they are to receive. 9
Despite the large sums spent annually for public welfare
in California, the monthly cash grants received by individual
welfare recipients are insufficient to provide them with a minimum amount for subsistence. In the adult categories, which
include all the categorial aid programs except AFDC, the
maximum allowable grants vary between $188.50 to $193.50
per month per recipient. 10 The average cash grant to the
elderly is $107 per month, to the disabled $120, to the blind
$149. 11 Even these sums exceed the amounts paid to needy
children of this state under the AFDC program. 12 Under
a system of inadequate need standards 13 and maximum grant

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

7. Section 402(a)(23) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)
reads as follows:
. provide
that by July 1, 1969, the amounts
used by the State to determine the
needs of individuals will have been
adjusted to reflect fully changes in
living costs since such amounts were
established, and any maximums that
the State imposes on the amount of aid
paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.' '
8. Bryant v. Montgomery, No.
51909 Civil [N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6,
1969].
9. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
318, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1126, 88 S. Ct.
2128, 2134 (1968).
10. Department of Social Welfare,
Research and Statistics Division, Public Assistance Caseloads and Expenditures, Jan. 6, 1970. Figures given
are for November, 1969.
566

11. The average grants are lower
than the maximum set forth above,
since many adult recipients have some
limited source of outside income such
as social security or veteran's benefits.
12. The disparities in the grants paid
to recipients in the various categories
(particularly between AFDC and the
adult aids) have been the subject of
recent litigation in other states. See,
e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.Supp.
1332, No. 3-3012-B Civil (N.D. Texas,
July 31, 1969, appeal to S.Ct.) CCH
Poverty Law Reporter § 10,055, p.
11,074.
13. The grant structure in the
AFDC program is based on figures
reflecting the cost of living in the period 1949-1951. Assembly Office of
Research and Staff of Assembly Committee on Social Welfare, California
Welfare: A Legislative Program for
Reform, p. 117 (February, 1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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ceilings,14 a woman with one child can receive no more than
$148 a month from the state, a woman with five children can
receive no more than $300 a month, and a woman with ten
children can receive no more than $392 a month/ 5 with $6
increases for additional children. 16 General assistance grants
(being supported solely out of county tax dollars) are even
lower than AFDC grants and are, in some instances, practically nonexistent. 17

III. A Review of the Cases
Given the general framework of the welfare system in
California, let us examine the cases that were decided in 1969.
In reviewing these cases, it is instructive to consider the
decisions in terms of their impact on the welfare system. The
discussion will begin with those cases directed against restrictive eligibility requirements, followed by the cases that have
challenged illegal limitations on the amount of welfare payments. Finally, there will be a discussion of those cases
directed at insuring that the welfare system will be fairly
administered with due regard to the statutory and constitutional rights of recipients.
14. Welf. & Inst. Code § lI450(a).
The maximum payable grants were last
increased by the legislature in 1957.
State Department of Social Welfare,
California Welfare Director's Newsletter, Vol. IV, No.6, p. 4 (NovemberDecember, 1968). A small upward adjustment of $2 or $3 per family was
made administratively in 1966 as a result of an increase in federal participation in the cost of the AFDC program.
Such an adjustment is required under
the governing statute.
15. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450(a)
(as adjusted). The quoted figures can
be found in the state welfare department's regulations, Public Social Service
Manual (PSS) §§ 44-313.

CAL LAW 1970
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16. The six dollar increment for additional children should once and for
all dispel the myth that it is profitable
to have more children on welfare to
obtain greater benefits.
17. The general assistance grants
paid by the various counties averaged
approximately $46 a month in California. U.S. Department of HEW Social
Security Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 12, p.
69, December, 1969. Figures for August, 1969. Some counties paid considerably less than that figure. Whether
the counties have met their obligations
to provide support for their indigents
under Welf. & Inst. Code § 17000 is
open to serious question.

567
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A. Cases Challenging Restrictive Eligibility Requirements
It is common knowledge among those familiar with the public assistance system that many thousands of needy persons
in California do not receive public assistance of any form. A
number of eligible persons do not apply for welfare either
because they are unaware of their right to public aid or because they voluntarily decide not to seek "charity" (a decision
partly induced by the community's generally negative attitude
toward persons on public assistance) .18
One reason for the increase in the number of persons on
welfare has been the activity of various groups, including community action agencies, welfare rights groups, and legal aid
programs in informing a growing number of poor people
of their entitlements under the public assistance programs. 19
The largest number of needy persons denied public assistance was excluded because of a series of restrictive eligibility requirements unrelated to their need for aid. The most
publicized of these requirements was the durational residency
test that operated, until recently, to deny public assistance to
many needy persons lawfully resident in California. 20
.Other examples of restrictive eligibility requirements are
found in the AFDC program. At present, eligibility for
AFDC under both federal and state law turns on a finding not
only of need but also of "deprivation." Only needy children
who are deprived of "parental support," that is, who live in
families where one of the parents is deceased, continually absent from the home, physically or mentally incapacitated,l or
unemployed,2 are eligible for assistance. 3 Needy children
18. Scott, Briar. Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public
Welfare System, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 370
(1966) .

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

19. In California, once a person is
found eligible for assistance, he is entitled to aid as a matter of statutory
right. Board of Social Welfare v.
L. A. County, 27 Cal.2d 81, 85-86,
162 P.2d 630, 633 (1945).
Most
568

recipients do not believe they have
such a right.
20. See text, infra, for a discussion
of the requirement and of the cases
successfully invalidating it.
1. 42 U.s.C. § 606(a)(1).
2. 42 U.S.c. § 607.
3. See Macias v. Finch, infra, for a
discussion of the court challenge to this
CAL LAW 1970
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whose parents are fully employed but earn less than the welfare standard of need are nevertheless ineligible for assistance.
Children between 16 and 18 are denied aid (even though
needy and deprived of parental support) unless they are in
school, in a training program, or disabled. 4 Other needy
children are denied aid if their mother refuses to sign a criminal complaint against their absent father, or otherwise fails
to cooperate with law enforcement officers. 5
Restrictive e1igibility requirements are also found in the
county administered general assistance programs. For example, needy individuals otherwise eligible for general assistance are denied aid in some counties on the ground that they
are medically employab1e (even if, in fact, no employment is
available to them).6
Recent court decisions in California have invalidated several of these restrictive e1igibility requirements. It is fair to
say that insofar as the decisions have invalidated existing
eligibility requirements, they have contributed to an expansion
in the number of needy persons eligible for assistance and have
resulted in increased welfare expenditures in California. 7
The most far-reaching decision affecting welfare eligibility
in California was the United States Supreme Court's decision
policy, commonly referred to in welfare parlance as the "Don't Work"
rule.
4. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11253.
5. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477.
6. Two cases are now pending in the
California federal courts challenging
this rule on the grounds that it creates
a conclusive presumption in violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also contended that the rule violates California Welfare and Institutions Code Section
17000. Brunner v. Terzian, U.S.D.C.
No. 51813 (N.D. Cal., Temporary Restraining Order issued July 25, 1969,
Sweigert, J.) enjoining policy in Alameda County; and Robertson v. Born,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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U.S.D.C. No. 51364 (N.D. Cal., Preliminary Injunction issued on June 12,
1969, Peckham, J.) establishing a hearing procedure before aid could be
terminated and finding as a matter of
law that plaintiffs have established a
prima facie case that the rule violated
the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
7. The former State Welfare Director, John C. Montgomery, estimated
that the federal court's elimination of
the durational residency requirements
had a fiscal impact of $30,000,000 in
federal, state, and local funds. California Welfare Director's Newsletter,
Special Issue (Vol. V, No.6), p. 3.
(November-December, 1969).
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in the durational residency case of Shapiro v. Thompson,s
which resulted in the affirmance of a three-judge federal court's
decision to enjoin California's durational residency laws. 9 Before the Court's decision, needy persons in California who
were otherwise eligible for aid could not qualify for public
assistance unless they had resided in California for a specified
period of time. The time period ranged from 1 year in the
AFDC program 10 to 5 of the last 9 years in the OAS program.ll
California's residency laws reflected a welfare eligibility
requirement that has existed in one form or another from the
time of the Elizabethan Poor Laws. 12 Originally, the rationale
for the requirement was that a community had no responsibility for "outsiders," and that a locality was only obligated to
provide assistance for "its own." While that justification
might have had some foundation in the past, in a mobile
society such as the United States, the rationale becomes more
difficult to accept, particularly where a large portion of the
welfare costs are assumed by the federal government.
A majority of the United States Supreme Court held that
durational residency requirements were unconstitutional, since
they denied the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to residents of less than a year and interfered with an individual's fundamental right to traveP3 The
Court found that the effect of the waiting requirement was
to create two classes of resident families who were equally in
need of public assistance, but whose situation differed solely
on the basis of the fact that one group had resided in the state
for less than one year. On this basis, aid was granted to one
class while the second class was denied aid "upon which may

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

8. 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 89
S.Ct. 1322 (1969).
9. Burns v. Montgomery, 299 F.
Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1968) aff'd sub
/lorn; Montgomery v. Burns, 394 U.S.
848, 23 L.Ed.2d 31, 89 S.Ct. 1623
( 1969).
10. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11252.
11. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 12050 and
13550 (ATD). No period of residency
is required for the category Aid to the
Blind (§ 12550).
570

12. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 628, n. 7, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 611,
n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328, n. 7.
13. As to the District of Columbia,
the residency requirements were found
to be an unconstitutional discrimination
that violated the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 394 U.S. 618,
641-642, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 619-620, 89
S.Ct. 1322, 1335.

CAL LAW 1970

12

Sitkin: Welfare Law in California

Welfare Law

depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means
to subsist-food, shelter and other necessities of life.,,14
In reviewing the residency decision in light of present welfare litigation, a number of important points emerge. First,
the Court laid to rest the notion that constitutional challenges to welfare practices can be answered by the argument
that welfare is a "privilege and not a right. ,,15
The Court (while recognizing the interest of the state in
conserving state funds) flatly rejected the notion that this discrimination between needy persons could be justified as a
device to save money:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for
public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose
by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.
It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for
education by barring indigent children from its schools.
Similarly, in the cases before us, appellants must do more
than show that denying welfare benefits to new residents
saves money. The saving of the welfare costs cannot
justify an otherwise invidious classification. 16
The majority also made plain that the traditional equal
protection test of "any rational basis for the classification"17
did not apply to the instant case. Rather, the majority held
that unless the classification was necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, it was unconstitutional.
There has been considerable debate, following the Supreme
Court decision in Shapiro, regarding the scope of application
of the "compelling state interest" test in welfare cases. Some
argue that the more stringent test was applied only because
14. 394 U.S. 618, 627, 22 L.Ed.2d
600,610,89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327.
15. 394 U.S. 618, 627, 22 L.Ed.2d
600, 610, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327.
16. 394 U.S. 618, 633, 22 L.Ed.2d
600, 614, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330.
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17. Under the traditional standard,
equal protection is denied only if the
classification is without any rational
basis. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co. 220 U.S. 61, 78, 55 L.Ed.
369, 377, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340 (1911).
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constitutional rights were involved (the right to travel), while
others, including Justice Harlan in dissent,l8 concluded that
the majority followed a growing line of Supreme Court authority that requires the application of the "compelling interest" test in cases where a classification is based on certain
suspect criteria (i.e., wealth or race) 19 or affects fundamental
human rights such as the right to food, shelter, and other basic
necessities of life. 20
Since the Shapiro decision, only one California federal court
has squarely faced the question of what equal protection test
should be applied in reviewing social welfare legislation. 1 In
Macias v. Finch,2 a three-judge court concluded that the compelling state interest test should apply only where a recognized
constitutional right is directly involved. 3
In the Macias case, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the Social Security Act4 and of
a state welfare statute 5 on equal protection grounds. Their
principal contention was that the federal act, with its "depriva-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

18. 394 u.s. 618, 658, 22 L.Ed.2d
600, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1344. But
compare Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion at 394 U.S. 618, 642, 22 L.Ed.
2d 600, 619, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1335.
19. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017, 87
S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967) (race); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 668, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 173, 86 S.Ct.
1079, 1082 (1966) (wealth).
20. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 71, 20 L.Ed.2d 436, 439, 88 S.Ct.
1509, 1511 (1968) summarizing the
cases where the "compelling state interest" or "strict scrutiny" test was applied
in cases where fundamental human
rights were involved; see also Skinner v.
Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L.Ed.
1655,1660,62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113 (1942)
(right to procreate), and Brown v. Bd.
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L.Ed.
873, 74 S.Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180
(1954) (right to equal education opportunity) .
572

1. One welfare case decided prior to
Shapiro, now on appeal to the Supreme
Court, applied the traditional test without any discussion of the compelling interest test. Lewis v. Stark, - F.Supp.
-, No. 50285 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23,
1968) prob. juris. noted sub 110m., Lewis
v. Montgomery (U.S. Nov. 10, 1969, 38
U.S.L.W.3173). Now styled as Lewis
v. Martin.
2. - F.Supp. - , No. 50956 U.S.
D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) CCH
Poverty Law Reporter § 9568, p. 10.
3. Other recent California welfare
cases where decisions rested in whole
or part on equal protection grounds
did not speak specifically to this issue.
See, e.g., Kaiser v. Montgomery, - F.
Supp. - , No. 49613 (N.D. Cal., August
28, 1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter
§ 10,391, p. 11,299.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607.
5. Welf. & lust. Code § 11250(c).
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tion" as well as its "need" requirement, was discriminatory
in denying aid to children whose fathers were employed full
time. It was also contended that the statutes, commonly
referred to as the "Don't Work" rule, discouraged recipients
from seeking employment. Alternatively, they argued that
certain federal regulations denying AFDC to families where
the father was employed more than 30 hours a week (even
though his earnings were below the welfare standard of need)
violated the Social Security Act. After reviewing the legislative history of the Social Security Act, the Court rejected
the plaintiffs' statutory arguments, concluding that Congress
made eligible only those needy children who were deprived
of parental support or care by reason of death, continued absence from the home, physical or mental incapacity, or unemployment of a parent. In the Court's view, a needy child
not so deprived did not qualify for aid, and HEW did not
violate the act in defining "unemployment" in terms of the
number of hours worked rather than in terms of the amount
earned. 6
Regarding the constitutional claims, the Court held that
plaintiffs' right to equal protection was not violated by the denial of welfare aid to otherwise eligible needy children solely
because their father worked more than a given number of
hours. In so ruling, the Court applied the traditional equal
protection test of "any rational basis." The "compelling state
interest" test was rejected despite plaintiffs' argument that the
recognized constitutional right to seek and hold employment was penalized by the operation of the challenged
statutes. 7
Although acknowledging that a constitutional right to employment was involved, the Court restricted the holding of
Shapiro by stating that the more stringent equal protection
test applies to the restrictions on constitutional rights "where
those restrictions are drawn in terms of suspect classes or
6. Macias v. Finch, No. 50956,
(N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) pp.
7-10.

u.s. D.C.
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7. Macias v. Finch, No. 50956,
U.S.D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) pp.
7-10.
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to impinge on specifically enumerated rights."8 This conclusion appears to be an improper reading of Shapiro, even if one
limits its holding to requiring the application of the "compelling state interest" test to cases involving infringement of
constitutional rights. Certainly, the interference with the
right to travel in discouraging migration by denying welfare
aid is essentially the same interference that results in the
Macias case: namely, the discouragement of full-time employment if the result of obtaining such employment is a denial
of welfare assistance to supplement inadequate earnings.
Once the Macias court decided on the use of the traditional
equal protection test, the road was open for the acceptance
of any rational basis for the discrimination, and the plaintiffs'
claims were denied. It is expected that the case will be appealed and that other cases raising this equal protection issue
will be litigated in California.
Given the growing judicial recognition of the fundamental
interest a poor person has in the receipt of welfare, the "compelling state interest" test should be applied in scrutinizing
social welfare legislation that affects an individual's very means
of subsistence. A recent decision of a three-judge federal court
unanimously accepted this view. In the case of Rothstein v.
Wyman,9 a New York welfare statute was found to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Although finding the
classification unconstitutional under even traditional notions
of equal protection, the Court emphasized that in welfare
cases, strict scrutiny of legislation should be undertaken:
It can hardly be doubted that the subsistence level of our
indigent and unemployable aged, blind and disabled
involves a more crucial aspect of life and liberty than the
right to operate a business on Sunday or to extract gas
from subsoil. We believe that with the stakes so high
in terms of human misery the equal protection standard
to be applied should be stricter than that used upon review of commercial legislation and more nearly approxi-
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8. Macias v. Finch, No. 50956,
U.S.D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970)
p. 13.
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9. 303 F.Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y., 1969).
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mate that applied to laws affecting fundamental constitutional rights. Poverty is a bitter enough brew. It
should not be made even less palatable by the addition
of unjustifiable inequalities or discriminations. It must
not be forgotten that in most cases public assistance represents the last resource of those bereft of any alternative,lO
Not only are welfare recipients entitled to a court's most
exacting protection because of the character of the interest
affected, but such protection is compelled "by the defenseless
and disadvantaged state of the class of citizens [involved] who
are usually less able than others to enforce their rights."ll
Welfare recipients have not had an effective voice in the enactment of the laws that affect their lives. They are a minority usually held in low esteem by the general public. Under
such circumstances, the need for protection of their rights by
the courts is essential. As the Supreme Court recognized over
thirty years ago:
rP]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.l2
The issues in both the Shapiro and Macias cases may result
in positive legislative action to resolve the welfare problems
presented. It is generally accepted that the residency decision
provided a good deal of the impetus for the present administration's proposals for minimum national welfare standards
and for increased federal participation in meeting the cost
10. 303 F.Supp. 339, 347 (S.D.N.Y.,
1969). In another context, Mr. Justice
Douglas asked: "Is the right of a person to eat less basic than his right to
travel which we protected in Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 1601" Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255, 12 L. Ed.
2d 822, 874, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 1830.
Clearly not. Such a basic right should
CAL LAW 1970
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be entitled to the same protections afforded other constitutional rights.
11. 303 F.Supp. 339, 347.
12. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153, n. 4, 82 L.Ed.
1234, 1241, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, n. 4
(1938).
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of public assistance. Similarly, President Nixon's welfare
proposals13 recognized the cruel irony of denying aid to needy
families with working fathers while providing aid to equally
needy families whose fathers are unemployed or out of the
home. l4
The other major case decided in 1969 affecting eligibility
for welfare was Damico v. California. 15 Rather than resting
its decision on constitutional grounds, the Court struck down
a state eligibility requirement for AFDC as violative of federallaw. In so ruling, the Court followed the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in its 1968 decision of King v.
Smith/ 6 which declared Alabama's "substitute father" welfare
regulation invalid as inconsistent with the Social Security
Act. 17
In Damico, plaintiffs (mothers with needy children) were
separated from their spouses and were denied aid on the basis
of two California statutes18 that provided, in substance, that
aid may be granted to needy children deprived of parental
support or care because of the continued absence of a parent,
but that no aid may be granted for a separation that has endured less than three months. The state welfare regulations
excepted families from the three-month rule where legal action
had been taken to terminate the marriage. 19 Plaintiffs contended that the California statutes violated due process in creating
a conclusive presumption that the separation was not genuine
unless it endured for three months or a divorce action had been
13. Welfare Reform, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
Sept. 20, 1969, #8, p. 1233.
14. Welfare Reform, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
Sept. 20, 1969, #8, p. 1233.

15. Damico v. California, - F.Supp.
- , No. 46538 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12,
1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter §
10,477, p. 11,370.
16. 392 U.S. 309, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118,
88 S.Ct. 2128 (1968).
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17. The Damico case is also impor576

tant in welfare litigation since it resulted
in a 1967 Supreme Court decision holding that state administrative remedies
need not be exhausted prior to instituting civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, challenging state welfare laws
or practices. Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416,19 L.Ed.2d 647, 88 S.Ct. 526
(1967).
18. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 112S0(b),
11254.
19. State Department of Social Welfare, Public Social Services Manual,
§ 42-311 (1967).
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filed. Plaintiffs also contended that the statutes discriminated
against the poor (who could not afford divorce actions) and
Catholics (by virtue of their being unwilling or unable to file
for divorce on religious grounds) .
They pressed other constitutional arguments, but the Court
found for the plaintiffs on statutory rather than on constitutional grounds. The California statutes were "in conflict with
the· controlling federal statute and the primary purposes of
the AFDC program."20 In analyzing the statutes in question,
the Court recognized that its decision must be controlled by
the United States Supreme Court's well-supported conclusion
in King v. Smith that "Congress has determined . . . protection of dependent children is the paramount goal of
AFDC."l The Damico court then went on to hold that the
state statutes, which operated to create a rigid waiting period
as a precondition to receipt of aid, were contrary to the terms
of the Social Security Act. The state statutes and regulations
were found to "clearly [put] administrative convenience ahead
of the welfare of the needy children. This is not permitted
under the federal act."2 [Emphasis added.]
The state's argument that the three-month period was a
legitimate means to prevent fraud and to keep families together was also rejected on the basis of King v. Smith. As
Judge Weigel stated in commenting on King in this regard:
The Court there recognized the state's legitimate goal
of preventing immorality and illegitimacy but held that
the parent's wrongdoing should not be used to deprive
the children of aid, since the state had other methods
it could use to deal with such problems. 392 U.S. at
325-27. The same is true here. The state has many
possible ways to check the reliability of information
gathered from potential recipients, and thereby prevent
20. Damico v. California, - F.Supp.
- , No. 46538 Civil (N.D. Cal., Sept.
12, 1969) p. 5. CCH Poverty Law
Reporter § 10,478, p. 11372.
1. 392 U.S. 309, 325, 20 L.Ed.2d
1118, 1130, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2137.
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2. The Damico court relied on King
v. Smith as authority for this proposition. Damico v. California, - F. Supp.
- , No. 46538 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12,
1969) p. 7. CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,478, p. 11,373.
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fraud ab initio. It also may punish those who are subsequently found to have obtained benefits fraudulently.
But it may not, consistently with the AFDC program,
deny benefits to many eligible and needy children in order
to avoid granting benefits to those few children whose
parents have applied fraudulently.
Defendants further argue that the three-month waiting period furthers the legitimate state interest of keeping
families together, since parents will be less likely to separate if they know the children will have to wait three
months for aid. This legitimate interest is clearly promoted by means impermissible under the federal Act,
because it postulates deprivation of the children as the
club to keep the parents together. Moreover, the argument does not focus on the crucial inquiries which must
be made: Are the children eligible and needy? Is the
absence of the parent 'continued'?8
There still remain many welfare practices and laws in
California that place administrative convenience ahead of
the needs of the poor,4 that penalize children for the actions of
their parents, 6 and that exclude from aid persons entitled to
assistance under federallaw. 6 In all probability, the next year
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3. Damico v. California, - F. Supp.
- , No. 46538 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12,
1969) pp. 7, 8. CCH Poverty Law Reporter pp. 11373-11374. In holding
that the state statutes were invalid, the
court stressed California could still consider the length of the absence as one
of the factors in determining whether a
"continued absence" existed (recognizing that in appropriate cases, a bona fide
separation might exist after a few days),
but that the state could not deny aid to
needy children who in fact were deprived and therefore eligible for aid under the federal act on the basis of a conclusive presumption.
4. See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code §
11351, and the discussion of the Lewis
v. Montgomery decision, infra.
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5. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477, requires the termination of welfare aid to
needy children if their mother refuses
to sign a criminal complaint against
their father or fails otherwise to cooperate with law enforcement officials.
Recently, a suit challenging the validity
of this provision on constitutional statutory grounds was filed in San Francisco. Taylor v. Montgomery, No. C69-666 Civil (N.D. Cal., filed Dec.
30,
1969, Peckham,
J.)
(threejudge court convened and temporary restraining order issued Dec. 30, 1969).
A three-judge court in Connecticut recently invalidated a similar regulation.
Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp 761 (D.
Conn., 1969).
6. WeI. & Inst. Code § 11253. UnCAL LAW 1970
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will see more cases challenging these practices and statutes by
emphasizing the principles established in King v. Smith and
followed in Damico v. California.
B. Cases Challenging the Level of Welfare Payments

While the court decisions affecting eligibility were decided
in the main on constitutional or sharply contested statutory
grounds, litigation affecting the level of welfare payments
proved to be quite different. In most cases, the recipients
were asserting clearly defined rights under federal and state
law that had been too long ignored by the administrators
of public assistance in California.
Of the five cases decided in 1969, all but one (now on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court) were decided in
favor of the recipients. 7 In each of the cases save one, recipients were found to have been illegally deprived of welfare
benefits to which they were entitled as a matter of law. The
situation becomes more startling when it is recognized that
of the four decisions in favor of the recipients, only one was
decided on constitutional grounds. s In the other cases, courts
found clear and obvious violations of state and federal law
that resulted in the denial of assistance to thousands of recipients. 9
der federal law, all eligible persons are
entitled to assistance. Eligible children
in the AFDC program are defined as
those needy children under the age of
18. California, however, denies aid to
children between 16-18 unless they
meet additional state-imposed eligibility
requirements. (They must be in school,
in a training program, or employed.)
Under the reasoning of King v. Smith,
California has narrowed the definition
of "child" to exclude otherwise eligible
children as Alabama did in creating its
own definition of "parent," and thereby violated the Social Security Act's
mandate "that all eligible individuals receive aid." One case in California that
developed this argument resulted in the
convening of a three-judge federal court
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and the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the denial of
aid on the basis of Welf. & lnst. Code
§ 11253 to a 17-year-old boy.
Kerr
v. Montgomery, No. 50520 (N.D. Cal.,
Filed Dec. 30, 1968). The case was
later voluntarily dismissed as moot.
7. In commenting on the State Welfare Department's record in recent welfare cases, an unnamed state official
lamented: "We don't have a good batting average in the courts." Wall Street
Journal, page 7 (Wednesday, February
4, 1970).
8. Kaiser v. Montgomery, CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,299.
9. Ivy v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. S. F.
Cty. (No. 592705 Sept. 11, 1969); Nes579
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Not only have the cases reflected a pattern of law violation
on the part of the welfare bureaucracy of this state, but the
post-judgment history of two of these cases reflects a pattern
of intentional avoidance of court judgments. 1o It is indeed
ironic that a state administration that is so strident in urging
compliance with law and order fails to follow the law when the
poor and their welfare are at stake.
To appreciate the significance of the decisions of 1969,
it is essential to describe briefly the setting in which the cases
arose. The California Department of Social Welfare (through
the counties) is required to make payments to needy children
under the AFDC program in accordance with the provisions
of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11450, 11452, and
11454. Pursuant to section 11452, the department is charged
with determining each recipient's minimum need. In making
that determination, the department has computed for each
county a "Cost Schedule for Family Budget Units." This
cost schedule sets forth amounts representing the allowances
for the following items: housing, food, clothing, personal
needs, recreation, transportation, household operations, education and incidentals, utilities, and intermittent needs. l l The
amounts in the cost schedule for these items vary ~ccording to
such factors as a recipient's age, sex, and county of r~sidence~12
In establishing the amounts, the state department is required
to set the cost of the items in conformity with the mandate
of section 11452 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. For
example, housing allowances are to be established to il1sure
that the amounts contained in the schedules reflect the minimum cost of "safe, healthful housing."lS In practice, the
bitt v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty.
(No. 193675 Oct. 1, 1969); C.C.H. Poverty Law Reporter § 10,645 p. 11,513;
Daley v. State Department of Social
Welfare, 276 Cal. App.2d 961, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1969).
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10. Ivy v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. San
Francisco Cty. (No. 592705, Sept. 11,
1969); Nesbitt v. Montgomery Sup. Ct.
Sac. Cty. (No. 193675, Oct. 1, 1969)
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,645,
p. 11,513.
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11. California Department of Social
Welfare, Manual of Policies and Procedures (PSS) § 44-221.1-.21 and, generally, all of chapter 44 of the Manual.
Also Kaiser v. Montgomery No. 49613
Civil (N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969)
p.2.
12. Kaiser v. Montgomery, No.
49613 Civil (N.D. Cal., August 28,
1969) p. 2. CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,300.
13. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11452(a).
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amounts contained in the cost schedules do not reflect the
average minimum cost of many items in the standard, and, in
a number of instances, the amounts are grossly inadequate. 14
Once a family's needs are determined by the use of a cost
schedule (and any special nonrecurring needs are added),
the county welfare department calculates the amount of nonexempt income the family has available. If the family's minimum need exceeds its available income, the family has met the
"need" requirement for AFDC. Pursuant to section 11454,
a family is to be paid the amount of its minimum needs calculated pursuant to section 11452 (or that amount of its minimum needs not met by available income) unless that amount
exceeds the ceilings on aid payments established by section
11450 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This statute arbitrarily places a limit on the amount of money the
state will pay an AFDC family regardless of the amount of its
state-determined minimum needs. 15 These ceilings are commonly referred to as "maximum grants.,,16
14. Food allowances are on the average substantially below the levels set
by Welf. & Inst. Code § 11452. Each
recipient's monthly transportation allowance (set in 1950) is $1.00 (less than
the cost of three round-trip bus fares in
San Francisco). As to the inadequacy
of the housing allowances, see discussion of Ivy v. Montgomery, infra.

15. The maximum grants vary only
with the size of a family and do not
take age, sex, or county of residence
of a recipient into account. The maxima have no relationship to the
state-determined needs of a family.
In almost all cases, the maximum
grant ceiling for a family is less than
their state-determined needs. Unless
outside income is received by a family to supplement their monthly income
up to their state-determined needs,
they must live on maximum payments
set by Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450(a).
The counties have the option under
Welf. & Inst. Code § 11451 of paying
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the recipients additional sums from
county funds to meet their state-determined needs, but only Marin county
does this.
16. The maximum grants payable under the statute are as follows:
Children Living with One
Parent or Other Relative
Amount
Number
of Children
148
1
2 ..................... . 172
3
221
263
4
5
300
6
330
7
355
8
373

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

386
392

399
405
412
418
424
581
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Approximately one-half of the recipients of AFDC in California (by virtue of the maximum grant limitation of section
11450(a» subsist on incomes that are below their state-determined minimum needs.17 This fact, coupled with the realization that the state standards of need are set far below the
amounts actually necessary for a minimum basic standard of
adequate care, places the need for a raise in welfare grants
beyond debate.
Two of the cases decided in 1969 resulted in judicial holdings that (1) California's maximum grant statute is unconstitutional, and that (2) California's present standards of need
in the AFDC program are illegal and inadequate as a matter
.
of state law.
The first of these cases, Kaiser v. Montgomery/8 was
brought by a number of AFDC families who received welfare
grants below their state-determined needs. The suit was
brought as a class action on behalf of all other similarly situated families. The plaintiffs contended that section 11450 (a)
was unconstitutional, since the limitations imposed by the statute (1) lacked any reasonable basis in light of the purposes of
the aid program, and (2) arbitrarily deprived certain AFDC
recipients of assistance sufficient to meet their state-determined
need.
In a 2-1 decision, the federal Court held the statute to be
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 A preliminary injunction was issued enjoining
Children Living with
Two Eligible Parents
Number
Amount
of Children
1 ...................... 166
2 ...................... 191
3 ...................... 239
4 ...................... 282
5 ...................... 318
6 ...................... 349
7 ...................... 373
8 ......................

392

9 ...................... 404
10 ...................... 411
11 ...................... 417
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582

12 ......................
13 ......................
14 ......................
15 ......................
Plus $6.00 for each additional

424
430
437
443
child

17. Kaiser v. Montgomery, No.
49613 Civil USDC (N.D. Cal., August
28, 1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter
§ 10,391, p. 11,300, n. 2.
18. - F.Supp. - , No. 49613 Civil
(N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) CCH
Poverty Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,299.
19. - F.Supp. - , No. 49613 Civil
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its further enforcement,20 but the Court later stayed its injunction pending appeal of the case to the United States Supreme
Court. 1 The majority found that the maximum grant statute
lacked a reasonable relationship to the needs of AFDC recipients because the limitations it imposed took no account of
those factors the state itself used in determining need (i.e., age,
sex, unmet work expenses, and cost of living in each county)
nor did it take a reasonable account of family size in determining need. In analyzing the discrimination effected by the
statute, the Court observed that it operated with particular
harshness against large AFDC families. The majority cited
several examples of the effect of the statute on the plaintiffs'
families. One plaintiff, a mother with two teenage and two
subteen age children, needed $300 a month to subsist according to the state's own figures. Section 11450 (a), however,
permits a family of four needy children and one needy parent
only $263 on which to live. Another plaintiff, the mother
of eleven children all of whom were eligible to receive benefits, had a monthly state-determined need of $532. But according to section 11450 (a), the family could receive no more
than $399 per month. Therefore, this woman received $133
less per month than the state considered minimally necessary
to provide clothing, food, shelter, and other necessities for herself and her children.
(N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) CCH
Poverty Law Reporter p. 11,303.
20. - F.Supp. -, No. 49613 Civil
(N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) p. 10;
CCH Poverty Law Reporter p. 11,303.
1. The order granting the stay was
issued on Nov. 17, 1969, and is unreported. In all probability, the case will
be decided on a summary basis by the
Supreme Court (as was the case with
California residency decision) since another "maximum grant" case has already been argued before the Supreme
Court. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F.
Supp. 450 (D.Md., 1968) sub nom. Dandridge v. Williams, prob. juris. noted
CAL LAW 1970
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October 14, 1969 (38 USLW 3127).
(After submission of this article, the
United States Supreme Court in a 5-3
decision, upheld the constitutionality of
Maryland's maximum grants applying
the traditional equal protection test of
"any rational basis." The Supreme
Court limited the "compelling state interest" test to cases where constitutional
rights were involved. ( - U.S. - , 25
L.Ed.2d 491, 90 S.Ct. 1153,38 U.S.L.W.
4277 (1970).) On April 20, 1970, the
Court vacated the decision in Kaiser v.
Montgomery and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of
Dandridge (38 U.S.L.W. 3405).)
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In holding the statute unconstitutional, the majority followed similar federal court decisions in three other jurisdictions. a The fact that these other decisions involved absolute
ceilings on aid to families, while California's statute permits a
maximum increase of $6 per child regardless of a family size,
did not prove a significant reason for distinguishing those cases
from the Kaiser case. The Court simply noted that the $6 increment did not come anywhere near closing the gap between
child need and the actual aid received by children in large
families. s
The Court was careful to delineate the scope of its holding.
It was not making any determinations regarding the actual
needs of recipients or suggesting that the state must furnish
children with aid covering those needs. 4 The majority directed its attention solely to the constitutionality of section 11450
(a), and the method of payment it commands:
We say only that, the state having chosen to make expenditures to promote the welfare of needy children,
those expenditures may not be made in such a way as to
discriminate irrationally among the recipients. The limitations imposed by § 11450(a) create the forbidden irrational discrimination among recipients and that portion
of § 11450 (a) is therefore unconstitutional. 5
2. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F.
Supp. 450 (D.Md., 1968), sub nom.
Dandridge v. Williams (U.S. prob.
juris. noted October 14, 1969, argued
on Dec. 13, 1969); Westberry v. Fisher,
297 F.Supp. 1109 (D.Me. 1969); and
Dews v. Henry, 297 F.Supp. 587 (D.
Arizona, 1969). Another similar decision not cited by the majority was Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F.Supp. 1203 (W.D.
Wash., 1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,278, p. 11,223.
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3. As the majority noted: "The statutory increment of $6.00 for each child
after the ninth fails by at least $13 .00 to
meet the state-determined need of such
child for food alone." CCH Poverty
Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,301, n. 5.
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Kaiser v. Montgomery, No. 49613 Civil
USDC (N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969)
p.6.
4. The question of whether a state
must pay recipients their state-determined minimum needs was not raised
by plaintiffs in Kaiser. It remains an
open question raising state, federal, and
constitutional issues of great magnitude.
Given the present plight in which most
recipients find themselves, in all probability it will be an issue facing the
courts in the next several years.
5. Kaiser v. Montgomery, No. 49613
Civil USDC (N.D. Cal., August 28,
1969) pp. 9-10, and Kaiser v. Montgomery, CCH Poverty Law Reporter §
10,392, p. 11,303.
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As noted earlier, another case decided in 1969 found the
state-determined standards of need to be inadequate and in
clear violation of state law. In the case of Ivy v. Montgomery,6 plaintiffs, recipients of AFDC, brought a class action
on behalf of recipients in San Francisco and Alameda Counties, as well as all other counties in the state. They challenged
the validity of the minimum standards of need for the AFDC
program, which are set forth in cost schedules issued on a
county-by-county basis.7 Although the action challenged the
validity of all cost schedules in California (which contain
specific dollar figures for each of the items of need), the suit
focused primarily on the State Welfare Department's procedure for establishing the housing component of the need standard.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11452, the
State Welfare Department has a mandatory duty to establish
standards of need that reflect, inter alia, the minimum cost for
safe, healthful housing. The plaintiffs first alleged that the
department's regulation, 8 which required only that the
counties establish housing allowances based on actual costs
of housing rather than on the minimum cost of safe,
healthful housing, was in conflict with the governing statute.
It was further alleged that the cost schedules in Alameda and
San Francisco Counties, and in all other counties of the state,
were invalid, since the housing allowances contained therein
were much below the minimum standard of safe, healthful
housing required by Welfare and Institutions Code section
11452. It was also alleged that the housing allowances in the
cost schedules were far below the actual costs of housing and
therefore violated the department's own regulation. Finally,
it was contended that all the cost schedules were invalid because they were adopted without notice or the opportunity for
a hearing as required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
After a full trial in which virtually all the essential facts
6. Sup. Ct., San Francisco Cty., No.
592705. (Judgment entered September
11, 1969, Alvin E. Weinberger, J.)
7. The cost schedules are issued purCAL LAW 1970
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suant to the state Public Social Services
Manual (PSS) § 44-212.
8. Public Social Services Manual
(PSS) § 44-212.
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were stipulated to by the defendant State Department of Social
Welfare (including a stipulation that the application of present
cost schedules resulted in irreparable injury and malnutrition
among welfare children), 9 Superior Court Judge Alvin Weinberger sustained all of plaintiffs' contentions. He ruled that
all of the cost schedules were invalid, having been adopted
without notice and hearing as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. lO Judge Weinberger further held that the cost
schedules violated both the state's own regulation and the
mandate of section 11452, since the housing allowances contained therein were below the actual cost of housing as reflected in county samples in the possession of the defendants
and were even further below the minimum costs of safe, healthful housing. Finally, the trial judge held that the state's "actual rent" regulation violated the governing statute-Welfare
and Institutions Code section 11452.11
In reaching his decision, the trial judge made a number of
significant findings that illustrate the magnitude of the department's violation of state law. Based on stipulated facts, it was
found:
1. The housing allowances in San Francisco County for
1968 varied between $52 a month for 2 persons to
$80 for 10 persons. 12
2. The minimum costs of safe, healthful housing in San
Francisco County varied between $100 for 2 persons to $200 for 10 persons in 1968. 13
3. The average actual housing cost in San Francisco in
1969 according to the State Welfare Department's

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

9. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law entered Sept.
11, 1969, Findings of Fact No. 45. For
more general information on malnutrition among welfare recipients, see Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and
Malnutrition in the United States,
Hunger, USA p. 28 at 72 (1968), and
Le Beaux, "Life on ADC: Budgets of
Despair," in Poverty in America, p. 519
at 523-26 (Ferman, Kornbluh, and
Haber, eds., 1968).
586

10. Govt. Code §§ 11423-11425.
11. Ivy v. Montgomery, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment entered on September 11, 1969.
12. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of
Fact No. 14.
13. Ivy. v. Montgomery, Findings of
Fact No. 15.
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own data was approximately $23 higher than the
average housing aIlowance. I4
4. The gap between the AFDC allowance for rent and
the minimum rents actually paid for safe, healthful
housing can only be met out of the subsistence
amount allowed for other living necessities such as
food and clothing. For every rent dollar paid above
the AFDC allowance, the recipient has one dollar less than she needs for the other needs of her
family.I5
5. The application of the 1967, 1968, and 1969 Cost
Schedules in determining AFDC recipients' grants
has resulted in irreparable injury, including malnutrition and ascertainable monetary loss among
AFDC families. I6
6. The housing allowances contained in the Cost Schedules (except for annual cost-of-living increases begun in 1966 and a Federal pass-through increase)
are based on actual housing costs computed in 1950,
effective June 1951. 17
The defendants raised no serious defense to the action, but
maintained that no funds were available to meet the costs of
a judgment. The trial court ruled that the defense was legally
insufficient to prevent the entry of a judgment for plaintiffs. IS
The court found that plaintiffs did not have the burden of
establishing the existence of available funds to obtain the relief
sought, and further, that the General Fund of the State is available to meet the cost of unanticipated welfare expenditures
above the budget limitation set in section 32.5 of the Budget
Act if such expenditures are occasioned by rule or regulation change required by court order. I9
14. Ivy v. Montgomery,
Fact No.8.
15. Ivy v. Montgomery,
Fact No. 23.
16. Ivy v. Montgomery,
Fact No. 45.
17. Ivy v. Montgomery,
Fact No. 20.
CAL LAW 1970
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Findings of
Findings of
Findings of
Findings of

18. Ivy v. Montgomery, Conclusions
of Law No. 16. The same conclusion
was reached by Judge B. Abbott Goldberg in the case of Nesbitt v. Montgomery, discussed infra.
19. Ivy v. Montgomery, Conclusions
of Law Nos. 25 and 26.
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The court also found that the state had not submitted any
evidence to support its claim that no funds were available. 20
Indeed, all of the evidence before the court demonstrated that
more than ample funds were available to satisfy the judgment. l
On September 11, 1969, judgment was rendered in the case.
The Court enjoined further application of the invalid cost
schedules and ordered the State Welfare Director to immediately issue new cost schedules that would comply with the
statutory mandate of safe, healthful housing. 2
In light of the possible administrative complexity in issuing
cost schedules that would comply with the mandate of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11452, the Court further
ordered, as an interim measure and incidental to the prohibition against further application of the invalid cost schedules, that the State Welfare Department at least comply with
their own regulations pending adoption of new cost schedules,
and pay actual rents to the plaintiffs and similarly situated
families in San Francisco and Alameda Counties to prevent
further irreparable injury occurring in the period between
judgment and the adoption of valid cost schedules. 3
Shortly after judgment, the State Welfare Department held
public hearings to determine the actual costs of safe, healthful
housing and the other items of need for use in the cost schedules. Other than holding hearings in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, the State Welfare Department
took no other action to comply with the Court's judgment
until contempt proceedings were instituted against the State
Welfare Director. The trial court in its judgment had given
the state until October 15, 1969, to comply with its interim
payment order in San Francisco and Alameda Counties. 4 No

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

20. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of
Fact No. 59.
1. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of
Fact No. 56. The "availability of
funds" defense has no application in
these welfare cases as a matter of law
and fact. It is no more than a clever
tactic aimed at persuading courts to
avoid their responsibility to declare invalid and to enjoin illegal state welfare
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practices. Fortunately, the courts faced
with this argument have recognized its
irrelevance and have squarely rejected
the defense.
2. Ivy v Montgomery, Judgment, p.
3, paragraphs 1 and 3.
3. Ivy v. Montgomery, Judgment, p.
3, paragraph 2.
4. The court ordered that the payCAL LAW 1970
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payments were made on October 15. On October 21, the
state took an appeal from the judgment and asserted that its
appeal stayed the effect of the interim payment order. However, the state acknowledged that it was appealing only that
portion of the judgment regarding the interim payments. 5
Thus, the trial court's determination that all of the existing
cost schedules violated state law and that new schedules would
have to be immediately issued became final.
After the state had failed, for over two months, to comply
with the court's judgment, the plaintiffs moved for and obtained an order from the trial judge declaring the judgment not
stayed pending appeaLs The trial court, however, stayed the
effect of its order until the 15th of December, to allow
the state to apply for a writ of supersedeas in the Court of
Appeal. The court made it clear that if a writ was not issued,
its judgment would have to be complied with by December
15, 1969, or the State Welfare Director would face contempt
proceedings. 7
The Court of Appeal denied the State Welfare Department's
application for a writ of supersedeas. s The state failed to
comply with the court's order on the 15th of December, and
contempt proceedings were instituted shortly thereafter. A
hearing was held on December 30, 1969, which was continued
until January 13,1970, at which time the State Welfare Director indicated that finally (some four and a half months after
jUdgment) he was going to direct the payment of actual rent in
the two named counties, and that he was going to issue new
cost schedules containing increased housing allowances by
the end of February effective the 1st of June. The trial judge
ordered the adoption of new cost schedules by February 1,
ments be made retroactive to the date
of judgment.
5. Defendants-Appellants'
Petition
for Writ of Supersedeas dated December 12, 1969, filed in the first District
Court of Appeal, No. 27614, at p. 3.
6. Order Declaring Judgment is Not
Stayed Pending Appeal entered December 1, 1969.
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7. Order Declaring Judgment is Not
Stayed Pending Appeal, entered December 1, 1969.
8. Order Denying Petition for Writ
of Supersedeas and Temporary Restraining Order dated December 15,
1969, District Court of Appeal (lst
Dept., Div. 3), No. 27614.
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1970, and their implementation in all counties by March
1, 1970, continuing the contempt hearing until March 12,
1970.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the contempt proceeding and the individual responsibility of the members of the
State Welfare Department, Finance Department, and executive branch of government, the fact remains that state officials
defied a lawful court order for several months, a court order
that (except for interim relief) was not being appealed by the
state.
The defiance of a court order by the State Welfare Department was not limited to the Ivy case. A similar pattern was
repeated in another case, Nesbitt v. Montgomery.9 In Nesbitt,
the State Welfare Department was again found to be acting
in direct violation of the law. This time, however, the violation was of federal as well as state law. The department's
regulation establishing the method for exempting a portion of
a working AFDC recipient's earnings was held to conflict with
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1100810 and binding
federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare l l pursuant to the Social Security Act
amendment of 1967. 12 As a result, some 28,000 families in
California were illegally deprived of an average of $28 per
month in welfare payments. 13 The loss of welfare resulted
from the State Welfare Department's regulation requiring that
the federal earning exemption be applied against a recipi9. Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. No. 193675,
Dept. 4 (Memorandum Decision entered Oct. 1, 1969, B. Abbott Goldberg,
J.) CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,645,
p. 11,513.
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10. In relevant part, Welf. & Inst.
Code § 11008 reads:
"To the maximum extent permitted by
federal law, earned income of a recipient of aid under any public assistance program for which federal
funds are available shall not be considered income or resources of the recipient, and shall not be deducted from
590

the amount of aid to which the recipient
would otherwise be entitled."
11. The HEW regulations were issued on Jan. 29, 1969, in The Federal
Register, effective on publication. 34
Fed. Reg. No. 19, pp. 1394, 1396.
They were later recodified at 45 Code
Fed. Reg. § 233.20(a)(7); see also 45
Code Fed. Reg. § 233.20(a)(11)(ii).
12. 81 Stat. 881 (1968), 42 U.S.C.
§ 602.
13. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No.
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty.
(October 1, 1969) P 16.
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ent's net rather than gross earnings.14 Not only were recipients deprived of benefits to which they were legally entitled, but one of the major goals of social welfare-encouraging recipients to work-was compromised by the department's
illegal rule. I5
During the litigation, defendants conceded that their regulation was in conflict with the HEW regulation,I6 but still argued
that no judicial redress was available to the recipient plaintiffs.
Judge B. Abbott Goldberg, in a well-documented opinion,
held to the contrary, and enjoined the further application of
the invalid regulation. His decision was not appealed by the
state. In so ruling, Judge Goldberg made a number of significant points regarding the ability of welfare recipients to
seek judicial redress for violations of their rights under state
and federal law. First, Judge Goldberg found that the recipients had standing to challenge the validity of a state welfare regulation as violative of federal or state law in state
court. 17 The fact that the Secretary of HEW had not acted to
enforce his own regulation was no bar to judicial action by
aggrieved recipients. IS Judge Goldberg also found that state
courts could hear and resolve actions created by federal law. I9
14. The Secretary of HEW summarized the federal regulations' requirement as follows:
"The method for disregard of earned
income has been modified. In arriving
at the amount of earned income to be
applied against the assistance budget the
amount to be disregarded is to be deducted from gross income rather than
from net income. Next, the amount
allowed for work expenses is to be deducted. The remaining amount is then
applied against the assistance budget
(§ 233.20(a)(7»." 33 Fed. Reg. No. 19,
p. 1394 (Jan. 29, 1969).
15. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11205, provides in relevant part:
"It is the intent of the Legislature
that the employment and self-maintenance of parents of needy children be
encouraged to the maximum extent and
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that this chapter shall be administered
in such a way that needy children and
their parents will be encouraged and
inspired to assist in their own maintenance. The [state] department [of
Social Welfare] shall take all steps necessary to implement this section."

16. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No.
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. (October 1, 1969) p. 5.
17. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No.
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty.
(October 1, 1969) pp. 8-12.
18. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No.
193675 Dept 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty.
(October 1, 1969) pp. 6-7.
19. Miller v. Municipal Court, 22
CaI.2d 818, 851, 142 P.2d 297, 316
(1943). Judge Goldberg concluded that
petitioners not only had standing to
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With regard to standing under state law, Judge Goldberg
found the petitioners "interested person[s]" within the meaning of Government Code section 11440, because the regulations directly affected them, and "beneficially interested"
within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1086,
because they had sufficient reason to challenge the regulation. 20
Judge Goldberg also concluded that petitioners did not have
to exhaust their administrative remedies before instituting
court action. After carefully analyzing the relevant authorities, Judge Goldberg held that:
[P]etitioners may obtain a judicial determination of
the validity of the regulation by resorting to Gov. C.
§ 11440, or traditional mandamus, Brock v. Superior
Court, supra, 109 Cal. App.2d at 603 without exhausting the administrative remedies provided by Welfare
and Institutions Code §§ 10950 et seq.l
As in the Ivy case, the state's defense of lack of funds was
rejected as a matter of law. 2
On November 17, 1969, Judge Goldberg entered judgment
in the Nesbitt case enjoining forthwith the further application
of the state welfare regulation and declaring that the gross
rather than net income method of computing earning exemptions should have been applied since at least January 29, 1969
(the effective date of the federal regulation). Although the
State Welfare Department issued an emergency regulation
shortly after the court decision, it was not, by its terms, to replace the invalid regulation until February 1, 1970 (some two
and a half months after judgment).3
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maintain the proceeding, but also
the Court must hear the case.
20. Nesbitt v. Montgomery,
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac.
(October 1, 1969) p. 12.
1. Nesbitt v. Montgomery,
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty.
tober 1, 1969) p. 14.
2. Nesbitt v. Montgomery,
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty.
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No.
Cty.
No.
(OcNo.
(Oc-

tober 1, 1969) pp. 10-21. The Court
reviewed the leading authorities on this
question and found that unavailability
of funds is no impediment to the entry
of a judgment against the state. However, as in Ivy, the state failed to submit
any evidence to support its claim that
funds were unavailable.
3. Not only were the emergency regulations not to become operative until
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As in Ivy, contempt proceedings were instituted and, after
hearing, Judge Goldberg issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing immediate repeal of the newly adopted regulations.4 Of significance in terms of the State Welfare Department's pattern of law violation was the finding made by Judge
Goldberg after the contempt hearing:
. . . the former respondent John Montgomery as
Director of Social Welfare, and the former respondent
Paul C. Zimmer, as Acting Director of Social Welfare,
together with their counsel, engaged in a course of conduct designed to impede the enforcement of this Court's
judgment of November 17, 1969. The Court finds further, that since Montgomery has left the jurisdiction and
since Zimmer no longer acts as director, it is not expedient or necessary to proceed against them for their personal derelictions in regard to the judgment of November
17, 1969. The Court finds further that the present respondent, Robert Martin, as Director of Social Welfare,
is continuing the conduct of his two predecessors in violation of the judgment. 6
While the actions of the State Welfare Department may
have been motivated by fiscal or economic considerations, the
fact remains that these interests, as valid as they might be,
must be subservient to the rule of law. As the poor
have so often been told, the law must be obeyed until it is
changed through the legislative process. So long as the laws
are in force, they are binding even on state administrators,
and the courts must be looked to as the forum where the rights
of the poor may be vindicated.
Despite the court victories in the Ivy and Nesbitt cases, it is
apparent that the State Welfare Department benefited from its
violations of law for considerable periods of time before judgment was rendered in those cases. Welfare payments illegally denied recipients prior to judgment will in most cases
February 1, 1970, but they were conceded to be in violation of the court's judgment of November 17, 1969.
CAL LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

4. Peremptory Writ of Mandate filed
and entered Jan. 13, 1970.
5. Minute Order dated Jan. 13, 1970.
593

35

WeUare
Law Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 20
Cal Law Trends
and Developments,

be reflected as savings in state welfare costs. Until judgment, therefore, the state loses nothing by its violation of law.
Probably because of the sums involved, some trial courts have
been reluctant to grant retroactive payments or order the department to take effective corrective action to remedy the past
hardship caused by illegal regulations or practices. This situation should not and cannot continue, for it encourages the
type of law violations exemplified by the cases discussed herein. Recipients are entitled to those benefits illegally denied
them by the state. Equally important, the state must be held
responsible for its illegal actions and should not benefit from
its own wrongs. The right of recipients to receive retroactive
payments and the need for such relief was recognized by the
California Supreme Court over twenty-five years ago:
In the case now before us we are of the view that the
provisions for appeal to the State Social Welfare Board
and for 'the payments, if awarded, to commence from the
date the applicant was first entitled thereto' likewise subserve a clear public purpose by securing to those entitled to aid the full payment thereof 'from the date . . .
[they were] first entitled thereto' regardless of errors or
delays by local authorities. It was the mandatory duty
of the county to furnish aid according to the plan therefor which is laid down by the applicable provisions of the
Welfare and Institutions Code [citations omitted]. The
bare fact that an applicant has by one means or another
managed to ward off starvation pending receipt of the
payments to which he was previously entitled provides
no sufficient excuse for a county to refuse to make such
payments. To hold otherwise would, as suggested by
petitioner herein, provide a money-saving device for the
counties at the expense of those of our citizenry least
able to bear the burden thereof. 6
Violations of state law by the State Welfare Department
were not limited to the AFDC program. The Court of Ap-
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6. Board of Social Welfare v. Los
Angeles County, 27 Cal.2d 81, 85-86,
162 P.2d 630, 633 (1945); compare
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Proctor v. S. F. Port Authority, 266
Cal. App.2d 675, 72 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1st
Dist., 1968).
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peal, in the case of Daley v. State Department of Social Welfare,7 recently held that the exclusion of increases in the cost
of medical care -from consumer price indices for the purpose
of computing increases payable under welfare programs for
the blind, potentially self-supporting blind, disabled, and
elderly, did not conform to statutory directives 8 that such indices be used as a basis for computing changes in payments,
and were therefore invalid. The exclusion of the medical care
component resulted in a loss of $2 a month to recipients of
blind aid and $1 a month to elderly and disabled recipients. 9
(Although these sums might appear to be small, any recipient
living at a subsistence level can testify that the loss of one dollar is significant.) 10 To justify its action, the State Welfare
Department contended that the elimination of the medical
care component was proper, since medical expenses were being met by public payments under other programs. In answering this contention, the court indicated that the department's
thesis was one properly addressed to the legislature, but that it
could not justify the department's unilateral amendment of
existing state law.
In reaching its decision, the Daley court quoted from the
State Supreme Court decision in Morris v. Williams, which enjoined illegal state cuts in the Medi-Cal program: 11
Administrative regulations that violate acts of the Legislature are void. . . . They must conform to the legislative will if we are to preserve an orderly system of government.12 (Emphasis added.)
7. 276 Cal. App.2d 961,81 Cal. Rptr.
318 (1969) (3rd Dist., Oct. 16, 1969).
8. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 12150,
12650, 13100, 13701.
9. Daley v. State Department of Social Welfare, 276 Cal. App.2d 961, 962,
81 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319 (1969).
10. In commenting on the loss of $4
to a welfare recipient, a three-judge
federal court recently noted:
"While this may seem minor to most
citizens, it is of crucial importance to
the recipients here. . . . To an in-
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digent person now recelvmg approximately 90 cents per day for food, an
additional 15 cents per day can hardly
be described as de minimus. Access to
such bare necessities of life . . . involves a critical interest for those whose
life depends on it." Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F.Supp. 339, 348 (S.D.N.Y.,
1969).
11. 67 Cal.2d 733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689,
433 P.2d 697 (1967).
12. 67 Cal.2d 733, 737, 63 Cal. Rptr.
689, 692, 433 P.2d 697, 71)0.
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A writ of mandate was issued directing the State Welfare
Department to take all necessary steps to nullify and supersede
its action in 1968, regarding the annual adjustment of grants
of public assistance to reflect the change in the cost of living
and in lieu thereof, to put into effect, as of December 1, 1968,
an adjustment increasing recipients' grants by the proper
amount of the cost-of-living increase. 1s
The final case where recipients challenged a state statute
as violative of both federal law and the Constitution was
Lewis v. M artin.14 There, AFDC recipients challenged a
California statute15 that obligates an adult male assuming
the role of spouse (known as a "MARS man") or a stepfather
to support the needy children with whom he resides,16 and
requires that his income be considered in determining the
children's welfare grant whether or not he actually contributes
to their support. The statute, in conjunction with implementing state regulations,17 operates to conclusively presume that
the man's income (less certain deductions) is available for
such support. As a result, many needy children are denied
welfare aid or have their grants significantly reduced without
recelvmg any income. The statute's validity was upheld in
Lewis by a three-judge federal court. This case is presently
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13. The specific relief granted by the
Court is not reported in the decision, as
the Court only stated that a writ should
issue as prayed for by petitioners. 81
Cal. Rptr. 318, 320. However, the
terms of the relief set forth above reflect the prayer contained in the petition for the writ (pp. 11-12) filed in the
action.
14. Lewis v. Stark, No. 50284 Civil
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 23, 1968) prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Lewis v. Montgomery
(U.S. Nov. 10, 1969) (38 U.S.L.W.
3173). Now styled as Lewis v. Martin.
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 9299,
p. 10,543.
15. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11351.
Since the decision in Lewis, the statute
has been amended to include a new section 11351.5, but the same basic legal
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problems still exist with regard to its
validity.
16. The extent of the legal obligation
to support under the statute is open to
question. See People v. Rozell, 212
Cal. App.2d 875, 878, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478,
480; People v. Owens, 231 Cal. App.
2d 691, 697, 42 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157.
See also 44 Ops. Atty. Gen. 155, 157
where the Attorney General citing People v. Rozell concluded that a MARS
is a man ". . . who has no legal
obligation to support . . . and who
may legally refuse to do so." The Civil
Code expressly prohibits the imposition
of legal liability on stepfathers generally. Civ. Code § 209.
17. California Department of Social
Welfare Regulations, Public Social Services Manual § 44-133.5.
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before the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal. The Court, although finding a federal regulation I8 to be in direct conflict
with the state statute, held the HEW regulation to be invalid
as violative of the Social Security Act, despite the fact that the
regulation reaffirmed policies regarding the assumption of actually available income approved by the Supreme Court in
King v. Smith.I9
The Court also rejected plaintiffs' constitutional challenges
to the statute and regulations. The Court found no violation
of due process, despite the fact that the statute operated to
reduce state expenditures by irrefutably presuming receipt of
nonexistent child support. The presumption proves unusually
harsh, since the amount of assumed income is calculated by
using welfare need standards; the very standards found to be
inadequate in the Ivy case, above. In rejecting the due process contention, it is submitted the Court improperly placed
administrative convenience over the needs of impoverished
children in direct contravention of the purposes of the AFDC
program. 20 Plaintiffs' equal protection challenges were also
rejected, the Court employing the "any rational basis test" in
reaching its decision. I For an excellent summary of the constitutional challenges to Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 11351, and the serious questions they raise, see the California Supreme Court decision of People v. Gilbert. 2
18. 45 C.F.R. 203.1.
19. King v. Smith, n. 16, another
three-judge court upheld the HEW regulation and its decision was affirmed
per curiam by the Supreme Court. Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F.Supp. 409, aff'd
396 U.S. 5, 24 L.Ed.2d 5, 90 S.Ct. (1969). (After submission of this article, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the three-judge
court. 38 U.S.L.W. 4307 (April, 1970).)
(Given its holding, the United States
Supreme Court did not reach the
constitutional claims advanced by the
welfare recipients.)
20. Compare Damico v. California,
discussed supra, where a different three-
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judge court in the same district took a
seemingly contrary view.
1. See text, supra, for a discussion of
the proper equal protection test to be
applied in reviewing welfare legislation.

2. 1 Cal. Rptr. 475, 482-485, particularly n. 15 at 485, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724,
729-731, n. 15 at 731, 462 P.2d 580,
585-587, n. 15 at 587 (1969).
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court did
not have to resolve the constitutional
challenges to § 11351, since the Court
decided the case on other grounds.
The Court overturned a welfare fraud
conviction arising out of the failure of
a recipient to report her cohabitation
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C. Cases Affecting the Procedural Rights of Welfare
Recipients-Fair Administration
Over the years, those charged with the administration of
public assistance programs have developed a complex of procedures by which the right to receive welfare is determined,
modified, and terminated. Procedures were adopted to insure
that recipients were advised of their rights under the public
assistance programs,a and, further, that they were given a
right to contest decisions of the welfare department regarding
their status. 4 However, without legal counsel and without
knowledge of their rights, the vast majority of recipients were
unable to avail themselves of these procedural protections and
were subject to the unfettered discretion of their social workers. 5 Although many individual social workers were concerned about their clients' well-being, the need to protect individual rights was subsidiary to the overriding pressure to
conserve funds. 6 Not many administrative decisions were
with an unrelated male on the ground
that the special provision of Welf. &
Inst. Code § 11482 (classifying as a
misdemeanor any fraudulent representation in obtaining aid to dependent
children) precludes prosecution of such
fraud under the general theft statute,
Penal Code § 484. In so holding, the
Supreme Court expressly disapproved
the decision of the Court of Appeal in
People v. Lopez, 265 Cal. App.2d Supp.
980, 71 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1968).
3. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 1060710608, State Welfare Department Public
Social Services Manual, Regulations
40-107.1 and 40-109.1.
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4. The Social Security Act requires
that an administrative appeal procedure be established for all categorical
aid programs. See, e.g., 42 V.S.C. 602
(a)( 4). The administrative hearing
available to recipients is known as the
"fair hearing," where the local welfare
department's determination may be reviewed by an impartial official of the
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State Welfare Department. See HEW
Federal Handbook of Public Assistance
Administration, Part IV, §§ 6200 et seq.
for the procedural elements embodied
in the fair hearing; Welf. & Inst. Code
§§ 10950 et seq. and State Welfare
Regulations PSS 22-105-22-113.
5. See Briar, Welfare from Below:
Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 370
(1966); Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43
N.Y.V. L. Rev. 836 (1968) .
6. See Carlin, Howard and Mes'singer, Civil lustice and the Poor (Russell Sage Foundation, 1967). The California Assembly Office of Research
and the Staff of the Assembly Committee on Social Welfare stated: ". . .
It is clear that administrative 'accountability' is interpreted as a duty to avoid
ineligibility rather than as a duty to
make correct determinations.
This
produces a wasteful emphasis on overinvestigating eligibility and a tendency
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challenged, since most recipients accepted the welfare workers' word as final, and feared that "rocking the boat" might
lead to an end to their welfare grants. 7
Although recipients have been entitled to request state administrative hearings to review county action of which they
are aggrieved, until recently no opportunity for notice or hearing was given prior to the termination of welfare assistance.
As a result, thousands of recipients were erroneously or prematurely terminated from aid. s Many individuals, therefore,
were abruptly deprived of money to purchase food and pay
the rent; their only remedy being a state administrative hearing
in which a decision is usually rendered many months after aid
is terminated. 9
The question of the right to a hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits has been the subject of much litigation
in California and throughout the country. There has also
been a considerable amount of scholarly research on the subject. 10 Two California cases raising the issue are presently
pending before the United States and California Supreme
Courts. The facts in the first of these cases, Wheeler v.
toward denying legitimate claims when
any doubt exists." California Welfare:
A Legislative Program for Reform,
(Feb. 1969) at p. 92.
7. The California experience has
shown that social workers have great
power over recipients, even to the point
where recipients will abandon their constitutional rights rather than risk a
social worker's disfavor. Parrish v.
Civil Service Commission of the County of Alameda, 66 Cal.2d 260, 268-270,
57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628-630, 425 P.2d
223, 228-230 (I967); see, also, County
of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare
Board, 229 Cal. App.2d 762, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1964).
8. California Department of Social
Welfare, Circular Letter No. 2064
(Nov., 1967).
9. Over 30 percent of the cases await-
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ing hearing decisions have been pending over 6 months; approximately half
of the cases awaiting hearing decisions
have been pending for over 3 months.
SDSW, Division of Research & Statistics, Draft Table 62, prepared for the
1968-1969 Annual Statistical Report,
as yet unpublished.

10. See, e.g., Comment: Withdrawal
of Public Welfare: The Right to a
Prior Hearing, 76 Yale L.J. 1234
(1967); Burris and Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements in the Administration of Public
Assistance; The District of Columbia
Experience, 16 American University L.
Rev. 199 (1967); The Constitutional
Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 Michigan L. Rev. 112 (1969).
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Montgomery,11 illustrate the dangers and inequities inherent
in an inadequate hearing procedure.
Plaintiff, Mae Wheeler, was an elderly widow receiving public assistance under the OAS program. On August 30, 1967,
the county welfare department received an anonymous telephone call informing the county that Mrs. Wheeler had received the proceeds of her deceased son's insurance policy
and had transferred the money to her grandson. A welfare
worker contacted Mrs. Wheeler that same day. Mrs. Wheeler
explained that the money represented the proceeds of her son's
veterans' insurance policy and that her deceased son had previously made a deathbed wish that Mrs. Wheeler give the check
to her grandson in satisfaction of a debt owed by him to her
grandson. Mrs. Wheeler's OAS grant was terminated by the
county the next day because the county determined that she
had transferred the funds in order to remain eligible for welfare aid. In January, 1968 (some four months after aid was
withdrawn) a state hearing officer found that the county had
erred in terminating her benefits.12
Mrs. Wheeler filed suit on November 30, 1967, to challenge
termination of her benefits without prior notice or any opportunity for a hearing. Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli issued a temporary restraining order restoring Mrs. Wheeler's grant. He
found the action necessitated the convening of a three-judge
court, and found a class action appropriate. 13
During the course of the litigation, the California State
Welfare Department issued new regulations providing for an
informal conference prior to termination with a 3-day notice
requirement. 14 The new procedure was challenged as being
constitutionally inadequate, since it lacked many of the procedural protections usually associated with adjudicative hearings. 16 Specifically, it was contended that the notice period
11. 296 F.Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal.
1968); Prob. juris. noted, April 21,
1969, 394 U.S. 970, 22 L.Ed.2d 751,
89 S.Ct. 1452 (1969). Case argued on
October 13, 1969.
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12. Wheeler v. Montgomery, Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-6.

600

13. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F.
Supp. 138 (1968).
14. California State Department of
Social Welfare, Public Social Services
Manual, Regulation § 44-325.43.
15. Welfare terminations often involve factual determinations relating to
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was too short for adequate preparation, the conference was
not held before an impartial referee (but could be held before
the very person who made the initial decision to terminate),
confrontation and cross-examination were not available, there
was no requirement that a decision be based on the evidence,
and the burden of proof was placed on the recipient to re-establish eligibility. Despite these contentions, the federal Court
found the new California procedure to be constitutional, holding that the combination of the informal conference before
termination plus the existence of the state administrative hearing after termination, would provide sufficient procedural
protection to recipients such as Mrs. Wheeler. 16 In so ruling,
the Court failed to recognize that state administrative hearing
decisions were not rendered in a timely manner. 17 The Court
also failed to recognize that the existence of a subsequent state
administrative hearing (even if rendered within 60 days, as
required by federal law) is of little consolation to a recipient
without a means of subsistence who is denied an opportunity
to effectively contest an erroneous termination decision before
aid is withheld. 1s
third-party evidence and testimony.
This is especially true where AFDC
families are discontinued because there
is alleged to be a "man in the house."
In administrative hearings held subsequent to termination (where cross-examination and the subpoena power are
available), 54% of the cases resulted in
reversing county discontinuances of aid
and restoration of grants to California
recipients. Briar, The Welfare Appeals
System in California, October 23, 1968.
(Mimeographed copy on file at the
Graduate Social Welfare Library, University of California School of Social
Welfare, Berkeley, California.)
Dr.
Briar read, analyzed, codified, and compared statistically the 1,088 California
hearing decisions rendered in 1965-66.
16. 296 F.Supp. 138, 140.
17. Although HEW required the
states, effective July I, 1968, to render
administrative hearing decisions with-
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in 60 days from the date of request,
California failed to adhere to these requirements. Wheeler v. Montgomery,
Appellee's Brief, p. 17, n. 26.
18. Not only does termination of aid
without notice and hearing result in
severe individual injury, but it discourages later state administrative welfare:
". . . the brutal m:ed of the recipient
erroneously denied assistance will make
him all the less able to pursue the subsequent [fair] hearing now available.
Faced with the need to live somehow,
he can scarcely devote the time and
energy necessary to effectively show his
continued eligibility on appeal. Because of this, it is hardly surprising that
recipients rarely ever request a hearing
after the administrator stops payment."
(Comment: Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing,
76 Yale L.J. 1234, 1244 (1967).)
601

43

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 20

Welfare Law

Shortly after the federal Court's decision in Wheeler, a
California state court reviewed the constitutionality of the
regulation upheld in the Wheeler case and reached a contrary
result. In McCullough v. Terzian,19 a Superior Court judge
ordered the county welfare department to reinstate an AFDC
family's grant and to continue aid until a decision was rendered in a state administrative hearing. The Court found
that the pretermination hearing must at least require that the
decision be based solely on the evidence and be rendered by an
impartial person or body not previously connected with the
case. Because the Court felt these requirements were constitutionally compelled, it declared the new California informal conference procedure inadequate and invalid. The
Court issued a writ of mandate to the State Welfare Department establishing a procedure by which aid could continue
to a recipient pending a decision in the state administrative
hearing, if a request for such a hearing and an affidavit controverting the reasons for discontinuance were filed with the
welfare department. 2o
The McCullough decision was appealed, and on August
19, 1969, the decision of the trial court was reversed. 1 The
Court of Appeal held that the 3-day notice was not inadequate
as a matter of law, nor was cross-examination, confrontation,
or an impartial referee required in a pretermination hearing.
The Court also found that the regulation satisfied the procedural due process requirements of the California Constitution
and the California Welfare and Institutions Code.! On December 19, 1969, however, the Supreme Court of California
agreed to hear the McCullough case. 3 Thus, the decision of
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19. No. 379011, Cal. Sup. Ct., Alameda Cty. Judgment entered May 2,
1968.
20. No. 379011, Cal. Sup. Ct., Alameda Cty. Judgment entered May 2,
1968.
1. McCu\lough v. Terzian, 275 Cal.
App.2d 745, 80 Cal. Rptf. 283 (1969).
2. 275 Cal. App.2d 745, 754, 80 Cal.
Rptr 283, 289.
3. No substantial dislocation of the
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administrative agency has been experienced since the operation of the procedure established by the trial court in
the McCu\lough case. For an eightmonth period, September 20, 1968 to
April 20, 1969, only 55 recipients had
aid continued pending their fair hearing.
California Department, Research and
Statistics Division, Restoration of Aid
Payments Fo\lowing Filing of Affidavit,
Table 8 (May 6, 1969).
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the trial court remains in full force and effect, and aid can
continue pending the state administrative hearing decision
for recipients who contend their aid has been erroneously
terminated.
The Court of Appeal decision upholding the California
regulation gave a very strict reading to the cases involving
procedural due process, ruling in each instance that because
no case precisely granted the protections sought by the recipients, no right to the procedures requested was indicated.
More importantly, the Court failed to give any weight to
the plight of individual recipients erroneously denied aid or to
their dependent relationship vis-a-vis the welfare department.
Thus, the Court failed to perform the basic task of balancing
the competing interests of the individual and the state in
deciding what due process requires in this particular administrative context. 4
There is considerable reason to believe that the Court of
Appeal decision, as well as the three-judge Court decision in
Wheeler, will ultimately be reversed. 6 Since these decisions,
both the California6 and U.S. Supreme Courts 7 have held prejudgment wage garnishment unconstitutional, recognizing that
the withdrawal of one's livelihood (even temporarily) can
result in severe injury to the individual. s Furthermore, since
Wheeler, other federal and state courts faced with the issue
have ruled, in the main, that a hearing containing basic ele4. For the generally accepted test to
be applied in determining the extent to
which procedural protections are to be
afforded in a particular administrative
context, see the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 163,95 L.Ed. 817, 849,
71 S.Ct. 624, 644 (1951).
5. As noted supra, after submission
of this article, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the three-judge
court in the Wheeler case. - U.S.
-, 25 L.Ed.2d 307, 90 S.Ct. 1026, 38
U.S.L.W. 4230; see also Goldberg v.
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Kelly, - U.S. - , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 38
U.s.L.W. 4223 (March, 1970).
6. McCallop v. Universal Acceptance
Corp., No. 605038 (Sup. Ct. S.F., July
11, 1969). Aff'd, McCallop v. Carberry, No. S.F. 22705, 1 Cal.3d 903, 83
Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 (Sup. Ct.
of Calif., January 30, 1970).
7. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 23
L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969).
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 9879, p.
10,975.
8. 395 U.S. 337,340-342, 23 L.Ed.2d
349, 353-354, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 1822-23.
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ments of due process is required before welfare aid can be
terminated. 9 Indeed, two federal judges in the same district
where Wheeler was decided ruled that such hearings were
required before aid to General Assistance recipients could be
terminated or denied. 10 In addition, HEW, possibly as a result
of the court litigation and in recognition of the need for greater
procedural fairness in welfare administration, has issued a new
regulation to become effective June 1, 1970, that requires the
continuation of aid in contested welfare terminations pending
a state administrative hearing decision.l1
Given the significant interests of the recipients at stake when
aid is terminated, it is suggested that the administrative procedural protections afforded to others in our society should
also be granted welfare recipients. As Professor Charles
Reich has stated:
"In a society where a significant portion of population
is dependent on social welfare, decisions about eligibility
for benefits are among the most important that a government can make. By one set of values the granting of a
license to broadcast over a television channel, or to
build a hydroelectric project on a river, might seem of
more far-reaching significance. But in a society that considers the individual as its basic unit, a decision affecting
the life of a person or a family should not be taken by
means that would be unfair for a television station or a
power company. Indeed, full adjudicatory procedures
are far more appropriate in welfare cases than in most of
the areas of administrative procedure."12
9. See, e.g., Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.
Supp. 893 (S.D., New York, 1968), sub
nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, prob. juris.
noted April 21, 1969 (37 U.S.L.W.
3399). Argument held Oct. '13, 1969;
Machado v. Hackney, 299 F.Supp. 644
(W.D. Tex. 1969); Moore v. Houston,
No. 104435 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne
Cty., Nov. 1, 1968); CCH Poverty Law
Reporter § 10,717, p. 11,579.
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10. Robertson v. Born, No. 51364
Civil (N .D. Cal., a preliminary injunc604

tion issued June 12, 1969), ordering
a full hearing prior to termination of
county welfare benefits. Peckham, J .);
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10254, p.
11,201. Brunner v. Terzian, No. 51813
Civil (N.D. Cal.) (TRO granting similar
relief issued on July 25, 1969. Sweigert, J.); CCH Poverty Law Reporter §
10,248, p. 11,198.
11. 34 Fed. Reg. 13595, January 23,
1969.
12. Reich, Individual Rights and SoCA L. L.A W 1970
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Although some existing California statutes provide recipients with the promise of equitable treatment and assistance
from the county departments in the determination of their
eligibility and grant levels,13 often the statutory commands are
not followed in practice. For example, Welfare and Institutions Code section 10500, requires that:
"Every person administering aid under any public assistance program
perform his duties in such
manner as to secure for every [applicant] the maximum
"
amount of aid to which he is entitled .
Despite this statutory command and the detailed regulations implementing that statutory mandate, some counties
in California have engaged in the practice of not informing
individuals of their right to apply for particular public assistance programs or of their right to request a hearing if they
are aggrieved by county action. The Sutter County Welfare
Department was the most infamous violator of the statutory
mandate. To stop these practices, welfare recipients sought a
writ of mandate to compel the Sutter County Welfare Director
to advise all applicants of their right to apply for assistance
and of their right to a state administrative hearing. The petition was dismissed by the trial court, but the decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Diaz v. Quitoriano. 14 The reviewing Court held that no administrative
remedies need be exhausted to bring such a petition, since the
action was on behalf of a class of recipients and the state
administrative hearing process did not allow for class relief. The Court of Appeal set forth much of the statutory
and regulatory material referred to above,16 and concluded
that the county welfare departments had a duty to inform
recipients of their rights under the public assistance programs,
including their right to appeal. On remand of the case to the
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cial Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues. 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1253 (1965).

14. Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal.
App.2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969).

13. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 10500,
11000.

15. 268 Cal. App.2d 807, 810 n. 6,
74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361, n. 6.
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trial court, a stipulated judgment was entered. IS It was stipulated that petitioners' allegations regarding Sutter County's
action were true. Among the more significant portions of the
stipulated order, Sutter County agreed to:
"( 10) .
exercise their duty to courteously and
promptly grant every applicant the maximum amount of
aid to which he is entitled.
( 11) All inquirers shall be immediately advised of their
right to make written application for any type of [welfare] . . . aid.
( 13) Respondents shall advise all applicants of their
"17
right to request a fair hearing
The Diaz case is significant not only for the procedural
rights secured for the recipients of Sutter County and the
recognition that recipients may go directly to the courts for
vindication of their rights, but also is important for its exposure of the type of arbitrary and illegal practices that exist
in the administration of public assistance in this state. Although most counties do not act so blatantly as did Sutter
County, nevertheless, many procedural rights secured by state
and federal law are honored more in their violation than in
their obedience. 18
IV. Conclusion
The year 1969 has seen substantial legal challenges to
many of the practices and policies underpinning the present
welfare system. Many issues (indeed, many illegal practices)
are still to be brought before the courts. It is not surprising
16. Diaz v. Quitoriano, No. 14651
Sup. Ct. Sutter Cty. (July 7, 1969).
17. Diaz v. Quitoriano, No. 14651
Sup. Ct. Sutter Cty. (July 7, 1969).
18. As noted previously, California is
presently violating federal time requirements in the rendering of fair hearing
decisions. Until recently, California
failed to comply with state and federal

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20

606

law in compiling a summary of fair
hearing decisions that would be available to the public. At present, although
Aid to the Totally Disabled eligibility
determinations are to be made within
60 days, San Francisco County has had
over 1,000 cases pending for more than
six months. These are but a few of the
numerous examples of state and county
violations of existing law.
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that in many cases clear violations of law were found to exist.
For years, no legal representation was available to the poor,
no counter-pressures were operative to insure that individual
rights were not sacrificed for the sake of economy and ease of
administration. For years, no attorneys or organized groups
of recipients were available to hold the administrators of one
of the state's largest bureaucracies accountable for their actions.
Perhaps the best summary of the legal developments in the
welfare field in California was given by the former State Welfare Director in his final press statement:
Almost simultaneously, it seemed, with my appointment as Director by Governor Reagan there began a
series of court actions both state and national to challenge public welfare rules and regulations.
Here in California we have been challenged on dozens
of issues, all of them coming back to the fact that for the
first time, the poor have real and effective advocacy in
our courts. This, again, is the significant point transcending all other considerations and consequences. An
era of advocacy has begun out of which, I am sure, public
assistance is never going to be the same.
Not only is this happening through the courts, but also
in the meetings and hearings of welfare boards, advisory
commissions and administrators at every government
level. The poor have come out of their apathy, and our
accountability for what we do and why we do it is theirs
to know-as it always has been under the law but never
before so vocally sought. 19
Notwithstanding recent decisions, whether the courts can
serve as an effective means to redress the grievances of the poor
dependent upon public assistance is still an open question.
19. Calif. Welfare Director's Newsletter, Special Issue (Vol. V, No.6) p.
3-4 (Nov.-Dec. 1969).
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So, too, is the more fundamental question of whether our
society is ready and willing to support the poor adequately
and with dignity. Only one thing is certain-the era of advocacy by, and on behalf of, the poor will definitely continue.
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